A skyrocketing euro for a deep diving Europe

Although it is not the first time I write about why I think the actual exchange rate of the euro against other currencies is wrong (see here and here), the latest developments on the Eurozone's life well deserve a revision of the subject. A quick look at the Eurozone lets one see some not very encouraging facts. The Greek tragedy has been quieted down in the last days but is far from over. In fact almost everybody with eyes in the matter is expecting a default sooner rather than later. The only uncertainty seems to rest in knowing if it would be an orderly default, basically a giant debt restructuring effort (hopefully...), or a messy one.

On the opposite side of Europe we have Portugal, but it seems to be in the opposite side only geographically speaking, because its bonds have also been kicked out of investment grade and are now officially  'junk' grade like Greece's. This will make Portugal financing efforts (even) more difficult, which in turn could end with Portugal asking Europe for more money soon. And to complete the domino effect, this troubles are putting extra pressure into Italy's and Spain's not-exactly-buoyant finances.

Credit: Yahoo! Finance

But the euro simply does not care. As seen in the graph above, the euro is rising against the US Dollar, the British Pound and the Chinese Renminbi, and it is doing so with a specially notable rally in the actual week despite all the bad news surrounding the Eurozone. The european currency is spiking also against special cases like the Japanese Yen and the Swiss Franc, although this is a totally different matter. The Yen has its own set of playing rules because of the Fukushima incident, and the Swiss Franc had been overtly growing uncomfortable with its strength against the euro affecting their exports competitiveness. The case with China's Renminbi is a difficult one to analyze, but what happens with the Dollar and the Sterling Pound?

Too public to fail? The moral hazard with public institutions.

Although it copes most of the headlines lately by being the most extreme case, the financial problems of Greece's public institutions are not one of a kind... If you have a quick look worldwide you will see cities, councils, regions... having similar problems to pay their bills. You can find near-bankrupt cities in the US (specially in California and Florida) Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Japan... Public management at its worst seems to be the common factor, with some institutions walking on the edge of default.

We are not talking about having trouble finding money for new investments or projects, as this would be a totally normal (although not desirable) situation in the actual environment. They are struggling even to pay the most basic of services, like electricity or waste disposal. This problem may not be totally evident to citizens because said services are still being provided, but it is serious enough for everyone to be concerned about it. 

The question is, why are services still being provided if they are not being paid? Well, because public institutions enjoy preferential treatment from their suppliers and vendors. This preferential treatment is not precisely earned by being a good customer, but because of their size. The public sector represents a very big part of the total earnings for some of these suppliers and vendors, so they can not afford to stop providing them. They prefer the prospect of being paid ten months later (and this is not an exaggeration) than losing such a big client. They simply have no other option but to bear this load, specially when talking about local companies whose only client is the city council.

This creates a big problem though, as the inability of public institutions to pay their bills creates a highly destructive domino effect. Suppliers and vendors do not enjoy the same preferential treatment with their own business partners; they must pay on time as specified on their agreed terms or otherwise their partners will immediately stop serving them. As they do not get the money public institutions owe them, the disruption in their cash-flow creates a need for factoring or other ways of financing. And while this can be good for the financial sector, it is devastating for the companies being forced to use it. Some companies get strangled by those extra financial costs to the point their business is no longer profitable. In the end, this companies are forced to close or go bankrupt, leaving their employees jobless just because they had the worst client possible, a public institution.

Germany's biggest enemy: a strong euro.

Neither the (now certified) fall of Portugal nor increased debt pressures on other european peripheric countries have been enough to tumble down the never-ending rise of the euro exchange rate against other significant currencies. This should be very worrying for the heart and engine of the eurozone, Germany. I am sure Germany is already worried about that, what I mean is they should be worried enough to do something about it. 

A net exporter like Germany should not allow its currency to be its Achilles heel. Ok, the currency is not really German, but they are its founding fathers and the main reason why it exists... With this in mind, it becomes very difficult to understand why they allow 'their idea' to make their international trades more expensive and complicated. In the actual economic situation, competitiveness and efficiency are key to keep selling and Germany can lose their edge because of this. It is survival of the fittest.
The competitiveness indicators based on consumer prices published by the ECB show this trend clearly, see charts below (where 100% equals the index value in 1999 ) with an obviously sharp decline coincidental with the rise of the euro.

Harmonised competitiveness indicator for Germany. Credit: Deutsche Bundesbank

A strong euro is obviously good for debt issuing, for general borrowing and for imports but it can really hurt the muscle of Europe. Maybe you could think of it as eating everyday at McDonalds (no bashing here, just an example): it is cheap, it is easy and convenient as you can find one almost everywhere and it gets you through the day. But in the long-term fats are bad for your figure and, more importantly, bad for your most important muscle, the heart. The European Central Bank (ECB) is damaging the heart of Europe.

Tuning down inflation

Falling into deflation or stagflation has always been one of the greatest fear for politicians, economists and enterprises. A negative inflation rate theoretically means less money is available, in turn that means less credit and everybody knows what that means in a debt-dependent world like ours. Also deflation is correlated with lower prices, which people tend to associate with depressed economic growth. Whether one agrees with this affirmation or not, during last year's credit crunch it made some sense to be fearing deflation and its consequences,  thus no one worried about currency devaluation and general credit easiness to avoid it all costs.

Now, after the crunch is mostly forgotten and credit channels work again as normal, it begins to look like a flagrant excuse to keep interest rates at all-time lows and to support the worrying commodities rally. 

Strangely, some economists are still asking for a moderately higher inflation as a way to increase competitivity and as a way to cut salaries inadvertently (you cannot lower them without complaints, but you can make them effectively lower by increasing inflation) to boost employment. Everybody knows how to raise inflation, what is difficult is controlling its raise. Raising inflation when official levels are well under 4% would no be a problem by itself, the issue here is that official inflation levels are all wrong.